

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01  
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15  
USIA-06 OMB-01 SSM-03 DHA-02 /087 W  
-----150817Z 054026 /21

R 141500Z JAN 77  
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9247  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BELGRADE 245

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR YO EG IS LY UR XF  
SUBJ: TITO'S UPCOMING TALKS WITH QADHAFI AND SADAT

REF: (A) CAIRO 18000 (1976), (B) BELGRADE 8429 (1976)  
(NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: TITO'S ME TRIP FOLLOWS YEAR WHICH HAS SEEN  
VISITS BY SADAT, ASAD, ARAFAT AND WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS  
PRESIDENT GOLDMAN TO BELGRADE, LOWER RANKING ARAB COUNTRY  
DELEGATION VISITS TO YUGOSLAVIA AT THE RATE OF SEVERAL PER MONTH  
AND, BY ALL APPEARANCES, A FAIRLY CONSTANT FLOW OF MESSAGES  
BETWEEN TITO AND ARAB LEADERS THROUGHOUT THE ME. YUGOSLAVS  
APPEAR GENUINELY TO BELIEVE TIME IS RIPE FOR MOVEMENT ON ME  
SETTLEMENT AND THAT LOSS OF "MOMENTUM" NOW COULD PROVE FATAL  
TO ANY PROSPECTS FOR LASTING PEACE IN THE AREA. LINE IS  
ALSO BEING PEDDLED HERE THAT IN VIEW OF INCREASING  
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ARAB STRENGTH PROTRACTION OF CURRENT STANDOFF IS TO  
ISRAEL'S LONG TERM DISADVANTAGE. YUGOSLAVS CLEARLY  
BELIEVE THEY, I.E., TITO, CAN PLAY SIGNIFICANT ROLE  
BOTH IN STRENGTHENING INTER-ARAB SOLIDARITY AND IN  
INSURING THAT PALESTINIAN INTERESTS ARE  
KEPT IN FOREFRONT AS ARABS PREPARE FOR DESIRED RE-  
CONVENING OF GENEVA CONFERENCE. FSFA OFFICIAL STATED

"ALL STATES IN DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL" NOW PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE LATTER. SAME OFFICIAL RATHER COY ABOUT HOW ME ITEM WOULD BE INCLUDED IN BELGRADE '77 (CSCE) AGENDA BUT CLEARLY STATED GOY'S INTENT TO TRY TO MOVE CSCE IN THIS DIRECTION. KNOWLEDGEABLE YUGOSLAV FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMENTATOR TOLD US ONE CONCERN OF TITO IS TO HELP SADAT SHORE UP HIS DOMESTIC POSITION IN VIEW TITO'S BELIEF THAT EGYPTIAN LEADER HAS BEEN AS FORTHCOMING VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL AS IS NOW DOMESTICALLY PALATABLE. EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR HERE SAYS REST/VACATION WILL OCCUPY PORTION OF TITO'S TIME IN EGYPT. GOY STATES IT LOOKS FAVORABLE UPON IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET-EGYPTIAN TIES (THOUGH DOES NOT SEE RETURN TO PRE-SOVIET EXPULSION DAYS) AS WELL AS IN SOVIET-LIBYAN RELATIONS. EMBASSY FORESEES NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES AT THIS TIME IN FREQUENTLY REPORTED YUGOSLAV POSITION ON BASIC COMPONENTS OF ME SETTLEMENT NOR, WHILE YUGOSLAVS STRESS IMPORTANCE AND INTEREST OF TALKS AT THIS JUNCTURE, ARE ANY MAJOR SURPRISES IN TITO-SADAT OR TITO-QADHAFI MEETINGS NOW PREDICTABLE. END SUMMARY.

2. IN JAN 10 DISCUSSION WITH POLCOUNS AND EMBOFF FSFA OFFICE FOR NEAR EAST AFFAIRS DEPDIR ZAVASNIK CITED GENERAL PURPOSE OF TITO'S FORTHCOMING ME TRIP AS EFFORT TO CONTRIBUTE TO CURRENT "MOMENTUM" TOWARD ME SETTLEMENT, TO FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF INCREASING ARAB SOLIDARITY, TO INSURING PALESTINIAN INTERESTS ARE KEPT IN FOREFRONT OF ARAB CONCERNS AND TO INVOLVING THE NON-ALIGNED TO GREATER DEGREE IN SOLUTION OF ME PROBLEM. CONFIDENTIAL

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WHILE CHARACTERIZING PRESENT ATMOSPHERE AS "VERY GOOD" AND CURRENT TRENDS AS "POSITIVE", ZAVASNIK REPEATEDLY STRESSED PURPORTED GOY FEAR THAT LOSS OF "MOMENTUM" AND CONSEQUENT FAILURE TO ACHIEVE PEACE DURING CURRENT INTERVAL WOULD SERVE THE INTERESTS OF ME EXTREMISTS OF EVERY STRIPE AND LIKELY PLUNGE THE SITUATION INTO AN ENDLESS IMBROGLIO. ZAVASNIK AND OTHERS HAVE IN ADDITION ARGUED (ALBEIT SOMEWHAT INCONSISTENTLY IN VIEW OF YUGOSLAVIA'S RIGIDLY PRO-ARAB LEANINGS) THAT A PROTRACTION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION PRESENTS A GREATER THREAT TO ISRAEL'S INTERESTS THAN TO THOSE OF THE ARABS IN VIEW OF LATTER'S INCREASING STRENGTH. THEY EXPRESS BAFFLEMENT AT WHAT THEY SEE AS RABIN AND OTHERS' INFLEXIBILITY IN FACE OF THIS TREND.

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3. WHILE CONTRASTING DISSIMILAR YUGOSLAV VS. LIBYAN  
APPROACH TO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF ME PROBLEM WITH NEARLY  
IDENTICAL APPROACH THERETO SHARED BY YUGOSLAVIA AND EGYPT,  
ZAVASNIK CALLED YUGOSLAV RELATIONS WITH BOTH COUNTRIES  
"TRADITIONALLY GOOD" AND ARGUED THE EXISTENCE  
OF SUBSTANTIAL COMMON GROUND. "WE WILL REACH CERTAIN  
COMMON CONCLUSIONS", HE SAID, TO WIT, THE NECESSITY FOR  
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL ARAB LANDS OCCUPIED IN 1967  
AND THE "REALIZATION" OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING  
THE RIGHT TO AN "INDEPENDENT" STATE. ASKED FOR GOY  
ASSESSMENT OF PALESTINIAN EXPECTATIONS RE AN "INDEPENDENT  
STATE", ZAVASNIC MUMBLED SOMEWHAT UNCOMFORTABLY, "GAZA,  
WEST BANK AND A CORRIDOR". (NOTE: SINCE ZAVASNIK MORE  
THAN ONCE STRESSED ONLY THESE TWO POINTS, I.E., ISRAELI  
WITHDRAWAL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE, HE WAS ASKED WHETHER  
YUGOSLAVIA MIGHT NOW BE DE-EMPHASIZING THE THIRD POINT  
IN ITS OFT-STATED THREE-POINT POSITION ON A JUST ME  
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SETTLEMENT, I.E., RECOGNITION BY ALL STATES IN THE AREA  
OF ONE ANOTHER'S RIGHT TO EXIST. WITH SOME PRODDING  
ZAVASNIK STATED "OF COURSE" YUGOSLAVIA STILL BELIEVED  
IN NEED FOR INCLUDING LATTER AND WAS MYSTIFIED BY

ISRAEL'S APPARENT INABILITY TO PERCIEVE THAT "ALL (ARAB) STATES" DO OR ARE READY TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. QUESTIONED MORE CLOSELY, ZAVASNIK ADMITTED HIS REFERENCE WAS TO ARAB STATES "IN DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL", A MORE RESTRICTIVE REFERENCE SEEN AND HEARD WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY HERE IN DESCRIPTIONS OF ALLEGED ARAB FORTHCOMINGNESS.)

4. ZAVASNIK WOULD NOT BE DRAWN INTO COMPARISON OF RELATIVE STRENGTH OF YUGOSLAV-EGYPTIAN AND YUGOSLAV-LIBYAN RELATIONS BUT CLAIMED THAT YUGOSLAVIA AND EGYPT ADHERE TO "VERY CLOSE POLITICAL POSITIONS", THAT BILATERAL CONTACTS ARE FREQUENT AND THAT TITO-SADAT RELATIONSHIP IS OF CONSIDERABLE SIGNIFICANCE. HE EMPHASIZED ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF YUGOSLAV-LIBYAN TIES, NOTING THERE ARE "THOUSANDS OF YUGOSLAVS " (CLOSER TO 1000 BY OUR ESTIMATE) IN LIBYA ENGAGED IN VARIOUS PROJECTS, LARGELY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT. ASKED WHETHER OIL WERE VIEWED AS INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF THE YUGOSLAV-LIBYAN ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP, ZAVASNIK REPLIED THAT CURRENT, RELATIVELY SMALL YUGOSLAV IMPORTS OF OIL FROM LIBYA (IN COMPARISON WITH IRAQ) WERE RELATED TO COSTS OF YUGOSLAV PROJECTS IN LIBYA AND COULD BE INCREASED IF DESIRED. POLCOUNS RAISED OBVIOUSLY SPURIOUS RUMOR THAT YUGOSLAVIA HAD BECOME LIBYA'S CHIEF ARMS SUPPLIER, COMMENTING IT GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT SOVIET UNION ENJOYED THIS DISTINCTION. ZAVASNIK PROFESSED TO KNOW LITTLE ABOUT THE YUGOSLAV-LIBYAN MILITARY RELATIONS OTHER THAN THAT THEY WERE "GOOD", LAUGHINGLY ADDING THAT YUGOSLAVIA WAS CLEARLY IN NO POSITION TO COMPETE WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN SELLING ARMS TO LIBYA. HE DEMURRED COMPLETELY ON POLCOUNS' FOLLOW-UP QUESTION RE EXTENT OF YUGOSLAV-LIBYAN MILITARY TRAINING RELATIONSHIP. (NOTE: "TANJUG" REPORTED JAN 10

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ARRIVAL IN BELGRADE OF LIBYAN MILITARY DELEGATION HEADED BY ARMED FORCES COMMANDER COL. ABU BAKAR YUNIS JABER FOR TALKS WITH DEFSEC LJUBICIC AND RANKING JNA OFFICERS ON "POSSIBILITIES FOR THE FURTHER DEEPENING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO FRIENDLY AND NON-AIGNED COUNTRIES.")

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5. ASKED WHETHER BRIEFING OF SADAT ON TITO'S BREZHNEV MEETING WAS CONSIDERED A MATTER OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE IN UPCOMING TALKS ZAVASNIK RESPONDED THAT SINCE YUGOSLAV-EGYPTIAN CONTACTS WERE FREQUENT AND THE SUBJECT HAD ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED, TITO WOULD CONCENTRATE ON FILLING IN "THE DETAILS" OF HIS TALKS WITH BREZHNEV. GOY, HE SAID, VIEWS EGYPT AS "VERY MUCH INTERESTED" IN IMPROVING ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND GOY CONSIDERS SUCH MOVEMENT "HELPFUL", SINCE SOVIETS ARE AN IMPORTANT "FACTOR" IN THE ME. ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHETHER EGYPT'S DENIAL OF SOVIET ACCESS TO NAVAL SUPPORT FACILITIES AT ALEXANDRIA AND CONSEQUENT SOVIET PRESSURE ELSEWHERE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (INCLUDING ON YUGOSLAVIA) FOR PORT FACILITIES WERE LIKELY TO BE DISCUSSED BY TITO AND SADAT, ZAVASNIK SAID ONLY THAT TRUE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH FACILITIES TO NAVAL CAPABILITIES OF SUPER-POWERS WAS MINIMAL, THAT SOME (EGYPTIAN) FACILITIES MIGHT BE MADE AVAILABLE BUT THAT EVEN  
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IF SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RECONCILIATION WERE TO OCCUR A RETURN TO PRE-SOVIET EXPULSION DAYS WAS NOT IN THE CARDS. (MANY BELGRADE-BASED DIPLOMATS BELIEVE YUGOSLAVS WANT EGYPTIANS TO GIVE SOVIETS SOME FACILITIES TO REDUCE SOVIET PRESSURE FOR MORE PORT FACILITIES HERE.)

6. ME ISSUE AND BELGRADE (CSCE) '77. ZAVASNIK REITERATED THE INCREASINGLY FAMILIAR YUGOSLAV THEME THAT EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN ARE INTRINSICALLY

INTERTWINED AND THAT THE ME CRISIS, AS THE CURRENTLY PREEMINENT MEDITERRANEAN ISSUE, SHOULD NATURALLY BE ADDRESSED IN CSCE. THE ME, HE SAID, "MUST BE DEALT WITH MORE" AT BELGRADE '77. "WE FIND THE ARAB COUNTRIES ARE MORE INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING IN THESE CONFERENCES". HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT IN TITO'S TALKS WITH SADAT THE ME SITUATION PER SE WOULD BE THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION RATHER THAN POSSIBILITIES FOR ITS INCORPORATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CSCE. BUT HE CLAIMED GOY HAD NOT YET DECIDED EXACTLY WHAT FORM SUCH GREATER CSCE INVOLVEMENT WITH ME SHOULD TAKE.

7. QUERIED AS TO WHETHER ANY SURPRISES MIGHT BE EXPECTED IN COMMUNIQUE FROM QADHAFI AND SADAT TALKS, ZAVASNIK STATED MERELY THAT COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE HAS NOT YET BEEN DECIDED UPON.

8. COMMENT: AS REPORTED REF A VISIT MAY AT LEAST PARTLY BE EXPLAINED BY TITO'S RUMORED RESTLESSNESS AND WHAT EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR HERE CLAIMS IS YEARNING TO RELIVE IN SOME MEASURE THE GLORIES OF THE TITO-NASSER PAST. FURTHER ON TIMING, "POLITIKA" FOREIGN AFFAIRS CORRESPONDENT DUSAN SIMIC TOLD POLCOUNS TITO'S VISIT IS AIMED AT HELPING SHORE UP SADAT'S POSITION AT HOME IN VIEW OF GOY BELIEF THAT LATTER HAS NOW MOVED AS FAR TOWARD CONCILIATION WITH ISRAEL AS POSSIBLE AND RISKS UNDERCUTTING HIS DOMESTIC POLITICAL POSITION.

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9. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH ZAVASNIK AND SIMIC WE RAISED RECENT TREND IN YUGOSLAV PRESS COVERAGE OF ME TO EFFECT THAT GROWING US DEPNDENCE ON MID-EAST OIL RENDERS U.S. INCREASINGLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO ARAB PRESSURES AND THAT (TO QUOTE ONE ACCOUNT) "ISRAEL IS BECOMING TOO HEAVY A BURDEN EVEN TO A COUNTRY OF SUCH FINANCIAL POTENTIAL AS THE U.S." WE STRESSED TO EACH THAT YUGOSLAVS AND THEIR ARAB FRIENDS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT U.S. WOULD NEVER STRIVE FOR AGREEMENT MOTIVATED BY ARAB PRESSURE, MUCH LESS BLACKMAIL, AND THAT U.S. HAS NO INTENTION WHATEVER OF ABANDONING ISRAEL. U.S. DOES, WE POINTED OUT, AS DO YUGOSLAVS, VIEW OPTIMISTICALLY AND HOPEFULLY THE POSSIBILITY FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE. TO THIS END, WE SUGGESTED THAT RATHER THAN CONTINUED USE OF USUAL VAGUE YUGOSLAV FORMULATION THAT ALL STATES OF REGION HAVE RIGHT TO EXIST, USEFUL STEP WOULD BE FOR TITO TO SPECIFICALLY ENDORSE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST EITHER IN HIS OWN PUBLIC STATEMENTS OR IN YUGOSLAV-EGYPTIAN OR FUTURE COMMUNIQUE.

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## Message Attributes

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**Status:** NATIVE  
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**TAGS:** PFOR, YO, EG, IS, LY, UR, XF, (TITO, JOSIP BROZ)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
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